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1 Introduction
In this paper, we provide an economic framework to analyze investment in informal housing
in developing countries. Squatting is a major form of housing tenure in urban centers of
developing countries.1 With rapid growth of cities in the developing world, informal
housing has not only subsisted, but has indeed thrived.2 It is estimated that in Pune,
India, 40 percent of the population live in informal settlements.3 It has also become
increasingly clear that slum dwelling units do not convey the entire picture of ”informal
housing”. In countries where land markets are very distorted, slums (settlements consisting
of shacks, without basic services and utilities) are only the most visible part of informal
housing, the tip of the iceberg. Informal housing also consists of dwelling units with
construction (concrete, bricks, etc.) similar to those in the formal sector. Moreover, some
∗The research and data collection have been co-funded by a World Bank research program grant on “Ur-
banization and Quality of Life” and the UK DFID’s Urban Knowledge Generation and Toolkits program.
We are grateful to Somik Lall for providing us access to the data used here. The ﬁndings, interpretations
and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the view
of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or countries they represent.
1See Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988) for an overview.
2For example, in Morocco, it is estimated that the informal housing stock has grown at an annual
rate of 4 percent between 1992 and 2002, faster than the formal stock. In that country, informal housing
now accounts for 10 to 15 percent of the total housing stock, in spite of large programs of upgrading and
resettlement in the past 20 years by successive Governments. In other countries, the informal to formal
ratio in the housing stock is even higher.
3One important issue for cross-country comparisons is the deﬁnition of ”slums” and ”informal housing”.

















































































































dresidents in informal units have characteristics very similar to those of households living in
formal neighborhoods.4 In such cases, the main diﬀerence between a formal and informal
dwelling is that the informal dwelling has been built outside administrative procedures,
be it at the titling level (no title for the land parcel requested or obtained from the titling
authority) or at the construction level (no building permit requested or obtained from the
urban planning authority), and thus faces a risk of destruction. This in turn may have
implications for supply of basic infrastructure (roads) and utilities (electricity, water).
These elements show that in many countries construction of informal dwellings, rather
than being an exception, is considered by households and ﬁrms as a viable alternative
to constructing in the formal sector. Therefore, in equilibrium, both forms of investment
coexist, and policy actions on either sector have an inﬂuence on the other sector. Hence,
in order to devise eﬃcient housing policies in those countries, one has to understand how
the two alternatives compare and what drives their relative attractiveness.5 Our model
formalizes this observation. Formal and informal housing investment are distinguished
in terms of costs and risks. Theoretically, we show that the premium for the formal
sector should be higher for prices than for rents, because the diﬀerence between the two
premiums is a direct measure of the risk associated with investment in the informal sector.
Using household data from Pune, India, we estimate that the perceived risk on housing
investment in the informal sector is equivalent to an annual destruction rate ranging
between 1 and 2 percent. We use our approach to estimate investors’ risk in the informal
sector for other countries from results in previous papers.
Studies on informal housing have primarily focused on two issues. The ﬁrst is the esti-
mation of price or rent diﬀerentials between squatting and non-squatting areas (Jimenez,
1984, Jimenez, Friedman and Mayo, 1988). In these two papers, the focus is on the de-
mand side of the housing market. Diﬀerentials in rents (or prices) between squatter and
non-squatter units are attributed to eviction risk in the informal sector. The second ap-
4For example,in Morocco, the 1994 Census identiﬁed about 230,000 households living in slums (shacks),
and more than 700,000 living in concrete informal dwellings.
5General equilibrium eﬀects are mentioned in introduction by Lanjouw and Levy (2002), p 988, but not
considered afterwards.
2proach focuses on models of incomplete housing markets, where the incompleteness comes
from the absence of formal property rights (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002), or from large trans-
action costs (Hoy and Jimenez, 1991). These models focus on interactions in the housing
market, between buyers and sellers or between landlords and renters.6 However, there
has been a great body of literature focussing on the eﬀects of security of land tenure on
investment in the rural sector, for example the eﬀects of titling on investment (see Besley,
1995, Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak, 2002), or the impact of expropriation risk on use of
soil fertilizer in rural China (Jacoby, Li and Rozelle, 2002).
A disturbing point of demand-side models of tenure security as developed in the two
papers above is the fact that renters and owners are not distinguished, and thus are
assumed to face the same risks.7 Empirically, the two papers ﬁnd that diﬀerentials between
the formal and informal sectors were greater for prices than for rents, which cannot be
explained by their underlying model.8 One reason for these ﬁndings must be that renters
and owners in squatter dwellings do not face the same risks. Lanjouw and Levy (2002),
focusing on formal and informal property rights, note that the beneﬁts of having a title are
manifold: having a title increases tenure security, which allows households to capture the
beneﬁts of durable investments in housing; it also lowers transaction costs by clarifying
the nature of property rights; it allows households to use their parcel of land or their
dwelling as collateral for bank loans. Finally, when urban land is titled, utility providers
are able to charge for services, and municipal governments can use property taxes to
ﬁnance infrastructure, resulting in better serviced neighborhoods and dwellings. It is clear
that the ﬁrst three items on this list concern owners, rather than renters. Thus, it seems
reasonable to argue that the risk of building in the informal sector (be it called ”eviction
6Another strand of the literature has focussed on estimating the costs and beneﬁts of ”site and services”
programs for low-income housing ( for example, Kaufman and Quigley, 1987).
7In their introduction, Friedman, Jimen´ ez and Mayo (1991) themselves note: ”The rent in a squatter
area should be lower than rent in a formal area. One source of this diﬀerence is that a renter household
must be compensated for the inconvenience of possibly having to move, if evicted from a squatter area.
On the other hand, the price discount of owned units in squatter areas should compensate for the possible
loss of the housing capital, in addition to moving cost”.
8Jimenez (1984) found a 18 percent diﬀerential for the rents of rental units and 58 percent for the prices
of owner-occupied units. In Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988), the corresponding ﬁgures are 15 and 25
percent, respectively.
3risk” as in the earlier literature on the subject, or broken down into diﬀerent components
as above) is mainly borne by the owner of the dwelling, and relates to the certainty of
present and future cash ﬂows from the investment. On the other hand, renters with high
moving costs may care about physical eviction risk.
In this paper we clarify these issues. We show that appropriate data on rents and prices
of dwelling units in the formal and informal sectors can be used to isolate two economic
variables: the diﬀerence in rates of return on housing investment, which reﬂects the risks
borne only by investors, and the premium on rents for the formal sector, which reﬂects
conditions prevailing in rental markets. These two quantities have diﬀerent economic
meanings, and should therefore be analyzed separately. We consider a simple model of
investment in the housing market, where investors can choose between two sectors: the
formal sector, where physical investment faces no risk of destruction, and the informal
sector, where investment, in each period, is subject to an exogenous risk of destruction.
Construction costs diﬀer between the two sectors. On the demand side, all households are
renters.9 Renters shop for dwelling attributes and do not care about the sector (formal
or informal) per se. There is no moving cost, and renters can choose freely between the
formal and informal sector (no segregation in the housing market).
The implications of this simple model are the following. Free mobility of renters implies
that rents in the two sectors must be equal. On the supply side, the higher risk faced by
investors in the informal sector must be reﬂected in a higher return on equity invested.
Since rents are equal in the two sectors, the values of houses will be lower in the informal
sector. Returns on investment, measured by the rent-to-value ratio, will thus be higher
in the informal sector. This result relies only on investment side considerations and is
independent of assumptions on the households’ side. Thus it will hold even when there
are mobility costs or when households have intrinsic preferences for living in the formal
sector.
We use a survey conducted by the World Bank in the city of Pune, India. Among
9Owner-occupying households are seen both as investors and renters, insofar as they rent their dwellings
to themselves.
4other features, this survey had the peculiarity of asking the households, regardless of
tenure status, questions about the market rent and value of their dwelling. Thus, for every
dwelling in the sample, we have estimates of both the value and the market rent of the unit,
given by the household actually occupying that unit. This allows us to calculate individual
rates of return for each unit, without facing the typical selection bias problems, each house
serving as its own control.10 Comparing the distributions of returns in the informal and
formal sectors, we obtain the following results: (i) Rates of return are signiﬁcantly higher
in the informal sector, as predicted by the model. The mean rate of return in the formal
sector is 6.7 percent, versus 8.1 percent in the informal sector. This corresponds to a 1.4
point average premium, or 22 percent premium in relative value. (ii) These ﬁgures imply
a perceived risk on housing investment in the informal sector equivalent to an annual
destruction rate ranging between 1 and 2 percent, depending on assumptions regarding
the time horizon of housing investors. (iii) The two distributions of rates of return present
highly idiosyncratic components, and traditional explanatory variables proxying either the
strength of informal property right (Lanjouw and Levy, 2002), or lower perceived risks of
eviction (Jimenez, 1984, Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo, 1988) have little power to explain
the diﬀerences in individual rates of return between the formal and informal sector.
Our framework allows us to rationalize empirical ﬁndings of previous papers, which
found that premiums for the formal sector, as measured by including a dummy for formal
dwellings in otherwise classical hedonic equations, were always greater for prices than for
rents. We show that the diﬀerence between the two premiums directly reﬂects the risks on
housing investment in the informal sector and thus, should be positive. Moreover, from
this diﬀerence in premiums we can estimate the risk faced by informal investors, as in
our case. Calculations indicate that physical risk on informal investment was four to ﬁve
times higher in Davao than in Manilla at the beginning of the 1980s.
Lastly, we try to understand what factors may drive the rental premium for the formal
10In a typical survey, the selection problem would arise from the fact that only the rents are known for
the rental units, and the prices or estimated values for the dwelling occupied by their owners. A similar
technique is used by Lanjouw and Levy (2002). In their paper, they used a survey where households living
in untitled houses were asked to assess the value of their dwellings if it were titled.
5sector. In Pune, India, this premium is 35 percent, after controlling for observable charac-
teristics of the dwelling and of the neighborhood at our disposal. This ﬁgure is comparable
to but slightly higher than those found in previous studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic
model. Section 3 brieﬂy presents our data. The main results of the paper are given in
section 4. Section 5 presents some policy implications of the model. Section 6 presents
conclusions.
2 The Model
We consider a simple model of investment in the housing market where investors can
choose between the informal and formal sector. On the demand side there are households
who shop for the attributes of dwellings. Land is used only to produce housing, and is not
valued per se by households. There is only one type of house.
2.1 The Investor’s Problem
Deﬁne:
ρ opportunity cost of capital of the investor
β ≡ 1
1+ρ
d exogenous destruction factor, as perceived by investors
δ ≡ 1 − d
Rf annual unit rent in the formal sector
Ri annual unit rent in the informal sector
Cf construction costs in the formal sector
Ci construction costs in the informal sector.
Constructions costs in the formal (respectively informal) sector are assumed to be a
convex function of the quantity of housing units produced in this sector, qf (respectively
qi). In both sectors, investors maximize expected proﬁt from the investment. To simplify,
6we suppose that there is no inﬂation in the economy so that the rent of a dwelling stays
the same forever. In the formal sector, cash ﬂows include contemporaneous construction
costs, −Cf(q), and future rents totaling qRf per period. Since investment in the formal
sector beneﬁts from security of tenure, cash ﬂows generated by the investment last forever.
In the informal sector, cash ﬂows include contemporaneous construction costs, −Ci(q)
and future rents, qRi per period. But because of lack of formal land rights, the life span
of the dwelling is now uncertain. In each period, the dwelling is subject to an exogenous
probability of destruction d. When the unit is destroyed, the whole investment is lost and
rent ﬂows stop forever.
The expected discounted proﬁt of investment in the formal sector is:
πf(q) = −Cf(q) + q
∞ X
n=0










the unit value of housing investment.
Denoting δ ≡ 1−d, the probability that the unit will not be destroyed in a given year,
the expected discounted proﬁt of investment in the informal sector can be written as:








Let the value of the investment Vi be deﬁned in the same way as in the formal case.




















Rates of return on housing investment in both sectors are calculated as rf = Rf/Vf
in the formal sector, and ri = Ri/Vi in the formal sector. From (2), we get:
rf = 1 − β, ri = 1 − βδ (6)
such that rf < ri.
2.2 The Households’ Equilibrium Condition
Households are assumed to be renters and move freely, that is, there are no moving costs.11
Moreover they do not care about the sector in which they live (i.e., formal or informal)
per se.12 Thus the equilibrium condition is simply:
Rf = Ri = Re (7)
2.3 Equilibrium Determination
Quantities and rents in equilibrium, Re and qe, are determined by equating supply and




Demand for housing equals
qd(Re) = D(Re). (9)
11In particular, there is no return to tenure length (for example, no accumulation of social capital).
12The two assumptions on households are made only for the clarity of the argument. They will be
relaxed in the empirical section.
8Re and qe are functions of the taste parameters, the technology parameters, the actu-
alization factor of the investors and the perceived risk on informal investment d. Figure 1
shows how formal and informal quantities and rents are determined in equilibrium.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
2.4 Comparative Statics
We are mainly interested in two key parameters : the investors’ opportunity cost of capital
ρ, reﬂected in β, and the exogenous risk of destruction d, reﬂected in δ. Formal derivations
of the comparative statics of the model are relegated to Appendix 1.
2.4.1 Changing the Investors’ Opportunity Cost of Capital













These results are quite intuitive. As the investors’ opportunity cost of capital rises,
the discount factor β decreases, that is, future proﬁts are discounted more heavily. This
has two eﬀects: i) on the whole, housing investment becomes less attractive vis-` a-vis other
investments, ii) future risks of destruction become less of a problem, and the diﬀerence
between the two sectors diminishes. This causes informal investment to decrease less than
formal investment. Overall, housing quantity supplied decreases, and equilibrium rents
increase.
2.4.2 Changing the Investors’ Perceived Risk of Destruction
We now look at the changes in the exogenous destruction risk, d. The key intuition of the
model is the following. Since demand does not depend directly on d and supply depends
negatively on it, it follows that the equilibrium quantity of housing is negatively related
to d, whereas the equilibrium rent is an increasing function of d. Moreover, since formal
supply is not aﬀected by d and is upward sloping, a positive change in d results in higher
9housing quantity in the formal sector, more than oﬀset by a decrease in housing quantities
in the informal sector. The reverse is true when a decrease in d, that is an increase in δ,













Thus, lowering the destruction rate d (or raising δ) has the eﬀect of lowering the
equilibrium rent, augmenting the total quantity of housing, but lowering the quantity of
formal housing. The intuition is simple: as d decreases and δ closes up to one, informal
land becomes more and more indistinguishable from formal land. Since the cost diﬀerential
does not change, investment in informal housing becomes more attractive with respect to
investment in formal housing, thus raising the former and lowering the latter. The overall
eﬀect turns out to be positive, since the overall return on housing investment has increased.
3 The Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from a survey conducted by the World Bank
between August and October 2002 in the city of Pune, India. The respondent sample
comprises 2,849 households. The survey documents socio-demographic characteristics of
households, characteristics of dwelling units, tenure status, accessibility to infrastructure
facilities like water, electricity and transport. In addition, the survey also provides infor-
mation on the valuation of the units by households themselves, in the form of the two
following questions:
• Estimated present market price for a similar unit in this neighborhood,
• Estimated monthly rental value for a similar unit in this neighborhood.
The two questions are asked to all households irrespective of their tenure status. Thus
for every dwelling we have estimates of both the rent and the price.
10We now give some details on the way we constructed the main variables used in our
analysis. The main focus of the paper is on the distinction between formal and informal
housing. The Pune questionnaire included a question aimed at classifying the dwelling
into the following categories: a) non notiﬁed squatter settlement, b) notiﬁed squatter
settlement, c) resettlement, d) unauthorized colony, e) wadas,13 f) MHADA (Maharashtra
Housing and Area Development Authority) plots, g) MHADA ﬂats, h) cooperative housing,
i) employer housing (government or private), j) private builders/colonies, k) Core city area,
l) chawls,14 m) urban village. We deﬁne informal housing as the union of categories a), b)
and d). Formal housing is deﬁned as the union of all other categories.
Most previous studies in the ﬁeld have based their empirical distinction between formal
and informal housing on the existence of a formal title for the dwelling. In our dataset,
questions about the existence of a legal title and its type were asked only to the subset
of owners, which comprises 1,999 observations.15 That is the reason why we adopt an-
other deﬁnition for formal and informal housing. Our deﬁnition allows us to keep the
sample of renters (850 households) available for the analysis. The discrepancy between
the two deﬁnitions can be examined on the subsample of owners. Only 54 in 872 (6.3
percent) dwellings classiﬁed in the ”informal” category have a title, and only 15 in 1,127
(1.3 percent) dwellings classiﬁed as ”formal” have no formal title. Considering this good
correspondence between the two variables, we found it worthwhile to keep the whole sam-
ple of observations instead of working with only the subsample of owners. However, in the
empirical analysis we compare our results to those obtained with the ”title” variable on
the subsample of owners to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings.
A key variable in the analysis is the rate of return on housing investment. Denoting R
(respectively V ) the estimate of the annual market rent (respectively price) of a dwelling,
the rate of return for this dwelling is deﬁned as r = R/V .16 However, rates of return could
13Wadas are old-style houses typically located in inner cities.
14Chawls are multistoried one-room tenements.
15This makes sense, because households renting their units need not know or even care about the existence
of a title; nor should the precise nature of the title be known, at least in some cases.
16Strictly speaking, rates of return on housing should account for (expected) capital gains. However we
have no data on capital gains ; besides, there is no reason to suppose that housing prices should evolve
diﬀerently in the formal and informal sectors. In that case, taking only rental returns into account is
11not be computed for every observation in our sample. For 35 observations, information
was missing on rent only; for 101 observations, information was missing on price only; and
104 observations had missing values for both rent and price. Thus 240 observations were
dropped, reducing the size of our sample to 2609.
Other variables used in the analysis need some explanation. We begin with dwelling
unit characteristics. From the survey questions, dummies are constructed indicating the
absence of sewerage, the absence of toilets in the unit, the condition of the roof and the
walls, and water availability. Conditions of the roof and walls are deﬁned from the pre-
dominant materials used in their construction. ”Good condition” for roofs or walls means
that brick, stone, or concrete have been used. Households were asked detailed questions
about their water sources, the providers of water, the number of hours of availability of
water from each source per day, connections costs, monthly payments, and distance and
time to the water source when applicable. Appendix 2 gives some details on the answers
to water module in our sample. From preliminary investigations, we constructed three
types of variables to apprehend water availability:
• Dummies for primary water source. We isolated the three ”formal” water sources,
individual water connection, individual sub-connection, and community tap. We
expect rents and prices to vary with diﬀerent types of connection available.
• Dummy for secondary source of water.
• Availability in hours per day, interacted with the three dummies for formal water
sources. We expect rents and prices to vary with water availability, though dif-
ferently depending on the type of source. For example, we would expect a high
availability of water to have more impact on rents for an individual connection than
for a community tap.
With respect to household characteristics, we use dummies for the highest educational
level completed by the household head. The ﬁrst dummy groups people reporting no
enough to account for diﬀerences in returns between the two sectors.
12education at all. The second group includes people reporting some non-formal schooling,
some formal schooling or primary school. The third group includes middle, secondary
and higher secondary school. The last group includes technical training, college or post
graduate levels. We also use variables speciﬁc to the Indian context, and in particular to
Pune. These concern religion, caste and language. Religion is represented with a dummy
for hindu, which is the majority religion in Pune. Caste is represented by a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if the household is from a scheduled caste (that is belongs to
the lower caste level). Language is taken into account by a dummy taking the value 1 for
people reporting Marathi as their mother tongue. A measure of per capita consumption,
constructed from a report of fortnightly expenditures at the household level, is used. We
also constructed measures of assets held by the households. Apart from homeownership,
which is taken into account directly, the survey asked questions about possession and
purchase price of 20 kinds of durable assets. Based on the average purchase value reported
in the sample, the four most important assets are cars, two-wheelers, furniture and rugs,
and TV/VCRs. The asset indicators we consider are dummies for possession of cars,
two-wheelers, and TV/VCRs, and a dummy taking the value 1 when reported value of
furniture exceeds 5000 rupees.
4 Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
Before reporting the main empirical ﬁndings, it is interesting to look at summary statistics
of the main variables used in our empirical analysis (see Table 1). It is evident from Table
1, that informal and formal sectors diﬀer sharply in terms of household and dwelling
unit characteristics. Households living in informal sector, on average have more children
and lower per capita consumption and more often belong to the scheduled (lower) caste.
More than 50 percent of them have either no education or primary education, while in
the formal category approximately 70 percent of households have secondary, higher or
technical education. Diﬀerences in economic well being are further reﬂected in ownership
13of assets like television, two wheelers, automobile and furniture. A larger fraction of formal
households possess these assets.
Dwelling units in the two sectors also diﬀer sharply. Only 16 percent of informal units
have good quality roofs versus more than 50 percent in formal sector. Informal dwelling
units are smaller and lack proper toilet facilities and sewerage more often. Interestingly,
individual water connections are as frequent in the informal sector as in the formal sector.
However, formal households rely more on individual sub-connections and less on commu-
nity taps for water supply whereas the reverse is true for informal households. Lastly, in
the informal sector, average rent is three times lower and average value four times lower
than in the formal sector.
4.2 Analysis of Rates of Return on Housing
The main implication from our investment model is that rates of return on housing in-
vestment should be higher in the informal sector than in the formal sector. This can be
checked directly from our data, which allow us to compute individual rates of return for
every dwelling unit in the sample. Starting from our sample of 2,609 observations, we
drop 47 observations for which the rate of return is less than .005 or greater than .4. In
the rest of the empirical analysis, we use this restricted sample. The distributions of rates
of returns in the two sectors are shown in Figure 2. The two distributions look alike, the
informal distribution being a rightward mean-shifted version of the formal one. Regressing
rates of return on a dummy for formal sector, we obtain that the average rate of return is
6.7 percent in the formal sector and 8.1 percent in the informal sector, and the diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (Table 2a). Term money market rates at the time of the sur-
vey were around 6 to 7 percent. The averages we get thus seem consistent with a priori
reasonable values of investors’ opportunity cost if capital.17
To assess the robustness of this conclusion, we estimate the following equation,
17Recall that expected capital gains are not included in these estimations of housing returns, so that the
actual value of these returns is higher than the one we computed.
14r = c + αF + βO + γ(F × O) + ε, (10)
where r denotes the rate of return, F is the formal sector dummy and O is a dummy
indicating home ownership. Recall that questions about rent and price of the dwelling are
asked to every respondent, irrespective of their tenure status. If owners and renters diﬀer
systematically in their valuations of rents and prices,18 results from a simple regression of
rates of return on the formal dummy will reﬂect a composition eﬀect, since self-reported
owners are more frequent in the informal sector. Results of estimation are reported in
Table2a. The ﬁrst column reports results with the restriction β = γ = 0, the second
column reports results with γ = 0, and in the third column we report results without any
restrictions on parameters. From these regressions, we conclude that r is approximately
22 percent higher in the informal category. As a supplementary robustness check, we use
an alternative speciﬁcation where we use log value of r as a dependent variable. Results,
reported in Table 2b, are very similar to our previous speciﬁcation. We also ran regression
(10) on the subsample of owners, with F denoting the existence of a legal title for the
dwelling. Results, presented in Appendix 3, are once again very similar to those in table
2b.
4.3 Estimating Implied Destruction Risks on Informal Housing
Getting back to the theoretical model, we can relate the diﬀerence in rates of return on
housing in the two sectors to the two parameters governing that diﬀerence in the model,
i.e. the exogenous destruction risk and the investors’ discount factor. For a given value of
the investor’s opportunity cost of capital (OCC) ρ, there is a one-to-one mapping between
the diﬀerential in rates of returns the model and the destruction rate d. Indeed, from
formula (6), we get:
18For example, owners could tend to overstate their unit’s value because of idiosyncratic match between
them and their unit, and to underestimate the rent because they do not account for the risk of renting







rf − 1) ≈ ln( ri
rf ), we can directly approximate d by multiplying the investors’
OCC by the diﬀerential in rates of return, that is, 22 percent. Exact calculation gives
the following results. When the OCC of investors is 4 percent, the perceived risk of
destruction is only 1 percent. For an OCC of 5 percent (respectively 6 percent), it is 1.2
percent (respectively 1.5 percent). This is the ﬁrst measure of this risk we are aware of.
Presenting the results this way allows one to become aware that although price diﬀerentials
between the two sectors are quite high, the implied perceived destruction risk is low.
One of the reasons for this low estimate lies in the inﬁnite investment horizon considered
in the model. We also consider alternative values for the investment horizon of 20 and 50
years.19 These values seem good bounds for a realistic horizon (from Table 1, it can be
seen that dwellers in the informal sector have been in their dwelling for 24 years). When
the investment horizon is restricted to 50 years, implied perceived risk of destruction rises.
With a 20 year horizon, the implied destruction rates range between 2 to 3 percent, which
is fairly high. To understand these results, recall that the diﬀerential in rates of return
is governed by the ”life expectancy” of housing investment in the two sectors. Thus, a
very small risk of destruction can result in huge price diﬀerences between the two markets
because future ﬂows are heavily discounted. However, when the rate of destruction is
held constant and the horizon of investment diminishes in both sectors, only cash ﬂows
closer to present time remain, and these ﬂows are those which face less uncertainty in the
informal sector. Thus, the shorter the horizon, the larger the destruction rate has to be
for a given value of the diﬀerential in rates of return.




1−(βδ)n, where n is the time
horizon of investment.
164.4 Explaining Individual Rates of Return
We now try to explain the distribution of rates of return within each sector. From the
theoretical model, in the formal sector rates of return should be related to exogenous
factors aﬀecting the investor’s opportunity cost of capital, whereas in the informal sector,
rates of return should also depend on factors aﬀecting the risk to informal investment.
Opportunity cost of capital could vary with household characteristics. A priori shifters
include variables describing the position of the household in the life cycle (age, family type),
variables that could be linked to access to ﬁnancial markets (income, assets, education),
and variables that could reﬂect segregation, insofar as these prevent households from
accessing diﬀerentiated forms of investment (sex, caste, religion).
Concerning the risk to investment in the informal sector, previous literature gives us
three directions to investigate. The ﬁrst one concerns the existence of informal property
rights, and their strength. Lanjouw and Levy (2002) make a distinction between trans-
ferable and non-transferable informal property rights. Transferable property rights may
include title, the extent to which property boundaries in the neighborhood are settled, and
the extent to which any particular households has claims to a particular piece of property.
Non-transferable property rights are household characteristics that may contribute to its
authority or indicate that the household has greater access to other mechanisms of prop-
erty rights enforcements. Proxies for these variables used by Lanjouw and Levy include
income and assets, education, single-headed female households, and years of residence in
the dwelling.
The second argument, made by Jimenez (1984), Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988),
is that, due to heterogeneous tastes, households locate in places presenting various levels
of risk. These authors run hedonic price regressions for urban areas of the Philippines
to assess the premium given to dwelling values by property rights. Relating those to
household characteristics,20 they conclude that richer and smaller households are willing
to pay more for security than poorer or larger households. Although the set of variables
20Age of the head of household, household size, and a proxy for permanent income.
17considered in the two cases are close, the underlying reasons to consider them diverge.
Jimenez (1984), Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988) argue that unobservable tastes could
be correlated to exogenous variation in community level risk of eviction, whereas Lanjouw
and Levy (2002) consider a model where the households characteristics change the level
of eviction.
The third direction concerns ﬁnding variables relating to the neighborhood of dwellings
which could reﬂect the investor’s perception of risk on housing investment. This approach
has been suggested by Jimenez (1984), Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988), although
they look at housing demand, rather than housing investment. In our model, housing
investment will vary with the level of risk (which is exogenous), so that house types should
diﬀer in areas presenting diﬀerent levels of risk.21 Thus, house characteristics cannot be
used as exogenous shifters. We try to use only variables exogenous to the investment
problem.
From this brief discussion, it follows that household characteristics might reﬂect dif-
ferences in opportunity cost of capital, as well as diﬀerences in risk. Thus, they can be
expected to aﬀect rates of return in both sectors. On the other hand, exogenous neighbor-
hood characteristics are related only to perception of risk on informal investment; thus,
they should explain rates of return in the informal sector only.
We ﬁrst relate rates of return in both sectors to household characteristics. We run the
following regression
lnr = c + αF + Y β + η, (11)
where c is an intercept, F is the dummy variable for the formal sector, and Y is a vector
of household characteristics. Results are reported in Table 4. Household variables do
not have much explanatory power in the pooled regression. Running separate regressions
for the two sectors does not improve the explanatory power. R-squares actually drop as
21Another interpretation could be that higher investments are aimed at altering the level of risk for
that particular dwelling, because for example local authorities will hesitate more to destroy concrete,
multi-storey buildings than shacks.
18compared to the pooled regression. In the informal sector, the only variable signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level is the dummy for born in Pune, which decreases the risk. This variable
is not signiﬁcant in the formal sector regression. Education variables are signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level and aﬀect rates negatively in the informal sector, whereas they have
a positive sign in the formal sector regression (only the dummy for primary education
being signiﬁcant at 10 percent). Log value of per capita consumption also shows the same
pattern between the two sectors, although neither of the coeﬃcient are signiﬁcant. We
interpret these results in the following way. One one hand, higher education and income
signal greater access to ﬁnancial markets, and therefore higher opportunity cost of capital.
Hence the positive sign in the formal sector regression. On the other hand, these variables
also signal higher ability to defend one’s rights in the informal sector (non-transferable
property rights in the sense of Lanjouw and Levy, 2002). Hence the negative sign in the
informal sector regression. Thus, as expected, the same variables may inﬂuence rates of
return in more than one way.
Next, we relate rates of return in both sectors to neighborhood characteristics that
potentially inﬂuence perception of risk by investors. We try to use only variables exogenous
to the investment problem. In particular we look at sanitation facilities, time to nearest
bus stop and accessibility to community tap for water. The reason for including these
variables is that these services are provided by local municipalities. Moreover, it must be
noted that in Pune none of these facilities are ﬁnanced by local or property taxes. Provision
of these facilities could therefore reﬂect governments commitments in recognizing informal
settlements.
In addition, we also control for the spatial location of the dwelling in the form of the
ward where it is located. At the time of the survey the city of Pune was divided into
48 wards (boroughs) serving as electoral districts and also for administrative and repre-
sentative purposes. Risks to informal investment could diﬀer spatially, either because of
commitments of the government (unobserved to the econometrician) in recognizing partic-
ular informal settlements, of variations in political inﬂuence of informal settlements across
19wards, or because land planning and zoning at the city level have diﬀerent implications
for the tolerance of municipal authorities to informal settlements across the city.
In particular, we run the following regression
lnr = c + αF + Zβ + wi + ζ, (12)
where c is a constant term, F is a dummy variable for formal sector, Z are variables
describing provision of services by local authorities, and wi are ward dummies. Results
are reported in Table 5. In the ﬁrst column, we do not include ward dummies. We
ﬁnd that inclusion of dummies signiﬁcantly improves the explanatory power in terms of
R−squares. Another interesting feature of this result is that rates of return are 19 percent
and 22 percent higher in the informal sector with exclusion and inclusion of dummies for
wards respectively. This is similar to what we have found in regression (10). As expected,
we ﬁnd that provision of these services have no explanatory power when we run a separate
regression for the formal sector. In the informal sector, point estimates suggests that
provision of community tap for water supply raises the rate of return, implying a higher
probability of destruction. Therefore, informal settlements which rely on community tap
for water are more vulnerable in the sense that they face a higher risk of destruction. An
interpretation for this result could be that if the government were committed in recognizing
a particular informal settlement, households living in that settlement would rely more on
individual connections, or some form of piped water supply.
4.5 Interpreting Results from Previous Literature
The remaining of the empirical part of the paper tries to make the link between our
approach and empirical ﬁndings of Jimenez (1984), Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988).
Taking a demand-side approach in which renters and owners are not distinguished, they
run hedonic (log) price and (log) rent regressions for urban areas of the Philippines to
assess the premium given to dwelling values by property rights. Jimenez (1984) looking
at data from Davao, 1979, found a 18 percent diﬀerential for the rents of rental units and
2058 percent for the prices of owner-occupied units. In Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988),
the corresponding ﬁgures are 15 and 25 percent, respectively for Manilla, 1983.22 From
our model, these diﬀerences between owners and renters are readily explained and can
be used to obtain to separate the risks faced by investors from a risk faced by renters.
Indeed, suppose that the diﬀerences between the formal and informal sectors in log prices





lnR = Xγ1 + C1i + (∆Rf)F + ε1
lnV = Xγ2 + C2i + (∆Vf)F + ε2
(13)
where F denotes the dummy for formal sector, the C0s are the constants for the informal
sector in the hedonic regressions, and X is a vector of housing characteristics (which
does not include the constant). Thus ∆Rf is the observed rent premium for the formal
sector, and ∆Vf is the observed price premium for the formal sector. Diﬀerencing the
two equations, and using the fact that the rate of return on housing, r, is simply equal to
R/V , we get :
lnr = X(γ1 − γ2) + (C1i − C2i) + (∆Rf − ∆Vf)F + ε1 − ε2 (14)
The diﬀerence in log rates of return associated to the formal sector is the coeﬃcient of
the dummy variable F. This equals
∆r = ∆Rf − ∆Vf (15)
It turns out to be simply a ”diﬀerence in diﬀerence” estimator, i.e. the diﬀerence
between the premiums for the formal sector on (log) prices and (log) rents. We can now
give a straightforward interpretation of previous ﬁndings. Since risks are higher in the
informal sector, returns in this sector should be higher if one is to observe any investment
22Lanjouw and Levy (2002) report an overall eﬀect of title on properties’ value of 23.5 percent but do
not give the corresponding ﬁgure for rents.
21in that sector. Thus the coeﬃcient ∆r should be negative. From the expression of ∆r,
it follows that the average price premium for the formal sector should be higher than the
average rent premium.
Note, however, that in the context of our model, equation (14) contains endogenous
variables on the right-hand side, since investment (which would correspond to the X’s) and
rate of return are two endogenous variables, determined by the same exogenous variable,
the destruction rate d. Thus, ∆r cannot be interpreted as a causal eﬀect of F on r.
However, following the same empirical approach for Pune, India, we ﬁnd that the X’s are
very weakly correlated to rates of returns. Besides, the diﬀerential between the formal
and informal sector estimated this way is ∆r = 20 percent, very close to our previous
estimations. Extrapolating to the aforementioned studies, we conclude that this technique
may be used to obtain a measure of the investor’s premium. Results from estimation of
equations (13) are presented in Table 6. Results conform to intuition, and the explanatory
power of variables lies in the upper range of what is usually obtained in similar case: the
R-square for rents is .62, that for prices is .63.
Most of the explanatory variables have the expected signs. Firstly, both rents and
prices are higher in formal category, which is reﬂected by the positive coeﬃcient on the
formal dummy. Residents are willing to pay higher rents if the dwelling unit has more
rooms, kitchen, if there is proper sewerage, good toilet facilities, closer to public trans-
port facilities measured in terms of time to nearest bus stop. Moreover, households are
willing to pay higher rents for increased hours of water supply irrespective of the source.
These results are very similar when we look at sale prices instead of rents. However, it is
interesting to note that households’ willingness to pay in terms of rents are lower if they
have to invest in individual water connection or get an individual sub-connection for water
supply. Furthermore, rents are much lower if it relies on community tap as a source for
water supply. The results are similar when we look at prices but they are not signiﬁcant.
Our investment model can be used to estimate a destruction risk for Davao, 1979, and
Manilla, 1983. From Jimenez’ (1984) results for Davao, the ﬁgure corresponding to the
22investor’s premium would be 58 − 18 = 40 percent, whereas from Friedman et al. (1988),
the risk in Manilla there would be 25−15 = 10 percent. Results from the computation of
annual destruction risks implied by the model are gathered in Table 7. From those results,
one would conclude that destruction risks were about four times higher in Davao than in
Manilla. However, investors’ opportunity cost of capital may have been diﬀerent in the
two cities.
4.6 Why are Rents in the Informal Sector so Low ?
Lastly, we come back to the question of the diﬀerence in rents in the two sectors. All the
studies mentioned above found signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the rents in the two sectors, when
observable characteristics of the dwellings are accounted for in a rent hedonic equation.
From Table 6, our results show a diﬀerence of 35 percent in the rents of similar dwellings in
the two sectors. In our theoretical model, equality of rents relies on two assumptions: free
mobility of the households, and households having no intrinsic preference for the formal of
the informal sector. When the ﬁrst assumption is relaxed, renters, having mobility costs,
may be concerned by the eviction risk. Thus, as in Jimenez (1984), they will be willing
to pay less for a unit in the informal sector than in the formal sector. As regards the
latter assumption, common sense would suggest that households have a higher valuation
for dwellings in the formal sector. However, there is no direct evidence of this, as far as
we know. Other factors could account for this diﬀerence. The ﬁrst one is the inﬂuence of
all variables not observed by the econometrician that may have an impact on rents, such
as unobserved quality of dwelling units, access to basic utilities, distance to amenities,
transport facilities, etc. If those are on average worse in informal neighborhoods than
in formal ones, an hedonic equation including a dummy for informal sector will show a
negative coeﬃcient for this variable. A second type of factors relate to the legal, regulatory
and judiciary environment of the rental sector. For example, if the legal environment is
judged too biased in favor of renters, as appears common in developing countries, landlords
in the informal sector will face lower risks and rents will be lower in the informal sector.
23Lastly, taxes (for example, tax on rental income, property tax, utility tax, etc.) which
typically apply only to formal dwellings may result in equilibrium rent diﬀerentials between
the two sectors.
5 Discussion: Policy Issues
Our model shows that investments in the formal and informal sectors will be determined
mainly by the investors’ outside options (opportunity cost of capital), and by the risk
on investment in the informal sector. There is little a government can do about the
investors’ opportunity cost of capital. On the other hand, governments can use the risk
on informal investment to inﬂuence the attractiveness of the informal sector in one way or
another. Recall that δ is the perceived risk on informal investment, that is, the risk factor
used by investors to discount future income ﬂows.23 Thus, this factor is driven more
by what investors think the government will do, rather than by what the government
eﬀectively does. One of the policy options available to the government to change the
perception of risk attached to informal land is to make an explicit or implicit commitment
not to destroy informal settlements.24 On the other hand, a government can undertake
highly visible actions to erase informal settlements, as has been the case in 1999 in Dhaka,
Bangladesh (BBC, 1999). By such actions the government can actually raise the perceived
risk of investing in informal settlements, whereas the actual risk (as could be measured by
the ratio of informal dwellings destroyed in a given year over the total stock) is low. The
model highlights the dilemma faced by policy makers in many developing countries. Public
commitment not to enforce property rights will foster informal settlements.25 However,
such a commitment increases total housing investment, which is a desirable outcome in
case of severe housing shortage.
23This risk incorporates diﬀerent sources, for example: risk of demolition, other risks stemming from
insecurity of tenure (see Lanjouw and Levy, 2002).
24This has been observed in a number of countries, especially in Latin America (Payne, 2002).
25However, another interpretation of our model can be in terms of quality instead of quantity of in-
vestment. Following this interpretation, increase in investment security in the informal sector results in
increased investment by households in their dwellings, for example, improving walls, ﬂoors, adding stories,
as observed empirically (see Payne, 2002).
24Our model, however, suggests that the best way to reduce investment in the informal
sector is to make formal investment more attractive, by lowering the costs associated
with it. Direct costs include administrative, time and money costs of land titling and
compliance with zoning and building regulations. Casual data from developing countries
suggest these costs are signiﬁcant by any means. Indirect costs include all the legal and
regulatory barriers to an eﬃcient land market (the main of which concerns the land titling
system), which typically result in high price of formal serviced land. This alternative
approach to dealing with informal development has been recognized by many governments
in the last decade (see for example Payne, 2002). This paper provides a simple rationale
for this type of policy intervention. Figure 3 diagrammatically illustrates the equilibrium
changes resulting from reduction of costs in the formal sector. Total quantity and formal
quantity of housing increase, whereas quantity of informal housing and equilibrium rent
decrease.
However, some caveats apply to these results. Our basic model is designed for a better
understanding of risks faced by investors in the formal and informal housing markets. In
particular, we do not go into the details of discussing the cost functions in the two sectors.
Results from the previous sections are thus valid only in the case of exogenous land prices.
This setup may be realistic to describe land markets in developing countries where all
the land belongs to the State.26 In this context, the price of land can be thought of as
a policy variable, which can be used by the Government to achieve policy objectives. In
those countries landless people tend to invade portions of public land and build houses
for themselves, beginning with shacks and upgrading their dwellings over time. In this
context, there are few reasons to suppose that suppliers act on a competitive basis, or that
investments in the two sectors should have equal returns. However, when there exists a
market for formal land, investors can invest in both markets, and will look for the sector
oﬀering the higher returns. In equilibrium, the price of formal land will be determined
26This was a common case in developing countries in the seventies. In this case, the State sell formal
land to developers (often, these were State-owned companies operating non competitively, as in Morocco,
Jordan, and many countries of Africa). The price of land sold to developers was set by the State, and
examples show that actual prices resulted more from ad hoc decisions than economic reasoning.
25endogenously and will reﬂect diﬀerences in investment risks between formal and informal
sectors. As risk on informal housing investment decreases, informal land becomes a closer
substitute to formal land, and the price diﬀerential between formal and informal land will
decrease.
6 Conclusions
This work was motivated by the simple evidence that in many developing countries con-
struction of informal dwellings, rather than being an exception, is a viable alternative to
constructing in the formal sector. Our contribution can be summarized as follows. We
show that appropriate data on rents and prices of dwelling units in the formal and informal
sectors can be used to decompose the premiums for the formal sector in prices and rents
in two parts: the diﬀerence in rates of return on housing investment, which reﬂects the
risks borne only by investors, and the formal premium on rents, which reﬂects conditions
prevailing in rental markets and tastes of households. Those two quantities have diﬀerent
economic meanings, and should be analyzed separately. When risk on informal investment
is modeled as an exogenous annual destruction rate, estimates of the destruction rates can
be obtained very simply from the observed rate premium on informal investment and the
investor’s opportunity cost of capital.
On the empirical side, we show that rates of return on housing investment are indeed
higher in the informal sector than in the formal sector in the city of Pune. The implied
risk as perceived by investors in the housing sector is estimated to be equivalent to an
annual destruction rate ranging between 1 and 2 percent. The two distributions of rates
of returns present highly idiosyncratic components, and traditional explanatory variables
proxying either the strength of informal property rights or lower perceived risk of eviction
have little power to explain the diﬀerences between individual rates of return.
Our approach, by separating (temporal) risks faced by investors from (instantaneous)
risks faced by renters and other factors aﬀecting the rental market diﬀerently in the for-
26mal and informal sectors, sheds light on previous studies, which consistently found that
premiums for the formal sector were greater for prices than for rents. We show that the
diﬀerence between the two premiums precisely reﬂects the risk faced by investors.
Consistent with previous studies, we ﬁnd the diﬀerence in rents between the formal
and informal sectors to be important. Once observed characteristics of the dwellings and
of the neighborhood are controlled for, there is still a 35 percent gap between the two
sectors. This ﬁgure is comparable, although larger, than those found by Jimenez (1984)
and Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988) for the Philippines. This diﬀerence may be
explained only by unobservable characteristics of the dwellings, as well as by the diﬀerent
ways in which housing characteristics interact in the formal and informal sectors. However,
since the variables we use in our hedonic regressions are similar to those used in previous
papers, one can suppose that this high premium reﬂects idiosyncratic conditions of the
rental market in the informal sector in Pune. Exploiting datasets from other cities in
India could give us indications whether this high premium is particular to Pune city, or if
it reﬂects conditions prevailing in the rental markets throughout India. Further empirical
studies are needed to better understand what drives those diﬀerences across countries or
regions.
We believe that our very simple investment model can be extended in many fruitful
ways. An obvious extension consists in going beyond our literary discussion in section
4 to consider endogenous land prices. Other insights could be obtained by introducing
heterogeneity in the degree of uncertainty on informal investment (that is more categories
of informal land), or in the opportunity cost of capital (to reﬂect the diﬀerence between
private households with no or limited access to alternative portfolio choices and ﬁrms
with potentially high returns on ﬁnancial investments). Consider the latter case. If one
ﬁnds that ﬁrms (supposed to have higher opportunity cost of capital) only invest in the
formal sector, this would mean that returns in the informal sector are not high enough to
compensate for the higher risk on investment there. Methods similar to ours would thus
underestimate the eviction risk.
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287 Appendix
7.1 APPENDIX 1: Comparative Statics
Totally diﬀerencing the ﬁrst order conditions in (4) and equilibrium equation in (7) with
respect to β, we get:
dqi + dqf = D0(R)dR,
Rdβ
























































































































































































































so the response of informal supply is positive.
Next we do a similar analysis with changes in δ, or perceived risk of destruction.
Diﬀerencing the ﬁrst order conditions and equilibrium equations with respect to δ, we get:












































































where det(A) is the same as before.
7.2 APPENDIX 2: Water Data
All households in our sample have access to one source of water. 94 percent of house-
holds have access to ”formal” water sources, in the form of individual water connection
(55 percent), individual sub-connection (21 percent), or community tap (18 percent). All
households in those three categories are provided water by the Pune Municipal Corpora-
tion (PMC). The remnant of households (6 percent) access water, either by illegal water
connection, by someone else’s connection, community wells or hand pumps, etc. Concern-
ing availability of water, the distribution of the hours of availability per day presents two
humps (see ﬁgure 4), the main one around 6 hours per day and a smaller one around 24
hours per day. Some households having access to formal water supply also have access to a
second water source, such as individual hand pumps and tubewells or mini water systems.
Most households having a secondary water source report low availability per day of the
main source, which suggests a causality eﬀect. Secondary water sources are a means of
circumventing this low availability: 83 percent of users of secondary sources report a 24
hours per day availability for this source.
317.3 APPENDIX 3: Regression of rate of return on the subsample of
owners, with ”title” as the explanatory variable
See Table 8
7.4 APPENDIX 4: Rents and prices hedonic equations for formal and
informal sectors
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Figure 1: Equilibrium determination and effect of increase in 







































Figure 3: Effect of a decrease in formal production costs
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Details and Summary Statistics of the Variables for Informal and Formal Category 
















    
    A. Household Characteristics 
        
Hindu   .85  .36  1003  .88  .33  1846 
Scheduled Caste    .51  .50  1003  .28  .45  1846 
Marathi Speakers    .82  .38  1003  .81  .39  1846 
Age of the head of household    46  12.24  1002  50.41  13.24  1846 
Number of children in household    1.63  1.44  1003  1.11  1.21  1846 
Size of household    5.35  2.05  1003  4.88  2.10  1846 
Female headed household   .12  .32  1003  .12  .33  1846 
Log value of per capita consumption   9.48  .52  1003  9.98 .62 1846 
Households’ with head greater than 60    .12  .33  1003  .22  .41  1846 
Distance to work (in meters)    5725  8307  731  7104  12432  1269 
Time to work (in minutes)    24  17.1  731  25.5  25.14  1269 
No education    .27  .45  1003  .11  .31  1846 
Primary education    .31  .46  1003  .18  .39  1846 
Secondary education    .37  .48  1003  .44  .50  1846 
Higher or technical education   .04  .20  1003  .27  .44  1846 
Born in Pune city    .63  .48  1003  .70  .46  1846 
Years in House    24.13  18.32  1003  30.6  29.5  1846 
Ownership of television    .85  .36  1003  .94  .24  1846 
Ownership of two wheeler    .26  .44  1003  .54  .50  1846 
Ownership of automobile    .04  .19  1003  .13  .33  1846 
Ownership of furniture (> Rupees 5000)    .36  .48  1003  .67  .47  1846 
    
    B. Dwelling Unit Characteristics 
        
Quality of roof (0 = bad, 1 = good)    .16  .37  1003  .52  .50  1846 
Quality of walls (0 = bad, 1 = good)    .76  .43  1003  .94  .24  1846 














Total area (in square feet)    351.99  513.06  989  1478.9  2102  1229 
Total space of residence (in square feet)    267.50  247.30  1003  504.5  508.34  1846 
Number of rooms    1.71  .87  1000  2.32  1.23  1825 
Space per room (in square feet)    152  84.40  1000  201.60  116.7  1825 
Kitchen (0 = no, 1 = yes)    .27  .45  1003  .58  .49  1846 
Quality of toilet (0 = good, 1 = bad)     .85  .36  1003  .41  .49  1846 
No sewerage (0 = yes, 1 = no)    .29  .45  1003  .18  .39  1846 
Own standing house (0 = no, 1 = yes)    .07  .25  1003  .12  .32  1846 
Attached house (0 = no, 1 = yes)    .93  .26  1003  .58  .49  1846 
Time to nearest bus stop (in minutes)   9.82  6.33  1001  7.46 4.97  1842 
Secondary water connection   .04  .19  1003  .07  .25  1846 
Individual water connection   .58  .49  1003  .54  .50  1846 
Individual sub-connection for water   .075  .26  1003  .28 .45  1846 
Community tap for water    .28  .45  1003  .12  .32  1846 




































1.06 3.82 1846 
Ownership of house (0 = no, 1 = yes)    .87  .34  1003  .61  .49  1846 
House used as workplace (0 = no, 1 = yes)    .10  .31  1003  .12  .32  1846 
Legal tile of ownership (0 = no, 1 = yes)    .062  .241  872
1 .99  .11 1127
2 
Monthly rent (in rupees)    883  1470  974   2,851  4884  1736 
Sale price (in rupees)    1,67,224  378835  946  6,92,364  1260882  1698 
Rate of return on investment in housing
3  .098  .23  943  .080  .16  1666 
                                                 
1 Legal title, only for owners of dwelling units. 
2 Legal tile, only for owners of dwelling units. 
3 Rate of return on investment in housing is calculated as  (Monthly rent × 12) / Sale price. Variable (1) (2) (3)
Formal Dummy -0.014 -0.016 -0.015
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.005)**
Own House Dummy -0.009 -0.007
(0.002)**  (0.004)
Own House * Formal -0.002
(0.005)
Intercept 0.081 0.088 0.087
(0.001)** (0.002)** (0.004)**
Observations 2562 2562 2562
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Formal Dummy -0.237 -0.257 -0.204
(0.024)** (0.025)** (0.060)**
Own House Dummy -0.082 -0.032
(0.027)** (0.059)
Own House * Formal -0.064
(0.066)
Intercept -2.656 -2.584 -2.628
(0.020)** (0.031)** (0.055)**
Observations 2562 2562 2562
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04
TABLE 2a
  NOTE. - The dependent variable is the log value of rate of return on housing. In the empirical analysis  
we dropped observations for which rate of return is greater than 0.4 or less than 0.05. In total 47 
observations were dropped.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Regression
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regressions of the Rate of Return
  NOTE. - The dependent variable is the rate of return on housing. In the empirical analysis we  
dropped observations for which rate of return is greater than 0.4 or less than 0.05. In total 47
observations were dropped.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
TABLE 2b
OLS Regression of Log Value of Rate of Return
Regression 
TABLE 3 
Opportunity cost of capital, Investment horizon, and Implied destruction rate (%) 
Implied annual destruction rate (%)  Investor's 
Opportunity cost of capital  Horizon = 20 years  Horizon = 50 years  Infinite Horizon 
      
0.01 2.2  0.9  0.2 
0.03 2.4  1.1  0.7 
0.04 2.5  1.3  0.9 
0.05 2.6  1.4  1.1 
0.06 2.7  1.5  1.3 
0.07 2.8  1.7  1.5 
0.08 3.0  1.9  1.8 
0.10 3.2  2.3  2.2 
 Variable All Households Informal Formal
Formal -0.183
(0.030)**
Own House -0.059 -0.025 -0.07
(0.028)* (0.055) (0.034)*
Hindu -0.067 -0.024 -0.095
(0.040) (0.059) (0.054)
Scheduled caste 0.036 0.008 0.051
(0.026) (0.037) (0.036)
Marathi speaker 0.024 -0.023 0.053
(0.0350) (0.0540) (0.0460)
Age of head of household -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001)* (0.002) (0.001)
Number of Children -0.001 -0.019 0.009
(0.013) (0.018) (0.017)
Size of Household 0.003 0.01 -0.001
(0.009) (0.014) (0.011)
Female headed household -0.03 -0.015 -0.031
(0.039) (0.058) (0.051)
Log value of per capita consumption 0.013 -0.059 0.055
(0.031) (0.049) (0.040)
Primary education -0.015 -0.089 0.105
(0.039) (0.048) (0.062)
Secondary education -0.066 -0.104 0.015
(0.038) (0.050)* (0.058)
Higher or technical education -0.055 -0.033 0.013
(0.049) (0.098) (0.066)
Years in house -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(0.0001)** (0.001) (0.001)**
Born in Pune city -0.022 -0.123 0.044
(0.026) (0.038)** (0.036)
Ownership of television -0.064 -0.081 -0.049
(0.043) (0.053) (0.067)
Ownership of two wheeler -0.064 -0.001 -0.095
(0.029)* (0.046) (0.037)*
Ownership of automobile -0.084 -0.157 -0.089
(0.046) (0.099) (0.054)
Ownership of Furniture (> Rupees 5000) 0.036 0.059 0.024
(0.028) (0.041) (0.037)
Intercept -2.445 -1.745 -3.118
(0.306)** (0.487)** (0.404)**
Observations 2561 928 1633
R-squared 0.06 0.04 0.04
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Regression
OLS Regression Explaining the Rates of Return: Household Characteristics
TABLE 4
  NOTE. - The dependent variable is the log value of rate of return. In the empirical analysis we dropped   
observations for which rents or sale price were missing. Furthermore, we have trimmed the data by
dropping observations for which rate of return is greater than 0.4 and less than .005.Variable Informal Formal
Formal -0.227 -0.193
(0.024)** (0.028)**
No sewerage 0.02 -0.002 -0.006 0.013
(0.028) (0.032) (0.047) (0.046)
Time to nearest bus stop 0 0 -0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Community tap for water 0.057 0.08 0.119 0.054
(0.033) (0.034)* (0.043)** (0.054)
Intercept -2.676 -2.708
(0.028)** (0.094)**
Ward Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2556 2556 927 1629
R-squared 0.04 0.09 0.1 0.08
TABLE 5
OLS Regression Explaining the Rates of Return: Exogenous Characteristics
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Regression
  NOTE. - The dependent variable is the log value of rate of return. In the empirical analysis we dropped
observations for which rents or sale price were missing. Furthermore, we have trimmed the data by dropping






Quality of roof 0.057 0.037
(0.036) (0.043)
Quality of walls 0.086 0.17
(0.040)* (0.049)**
Quality of exterior 0.299 0.256
(0.032)** (0.034)**
Total space of residence 0.0001 0
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Number of rooms 0.225 0.315
(0.030)** (0.035)**




House used as a workplace 0.197 0.198
(0.044)** (0.050)**
Quality of toilet -0.23 -0.205
(0.040)** (0.044)**
No sewerage -0.147 -0.17
(0.031)** (0.033)**
Own standing house 0.021 0.075
(0.057) (0.066)
Attached house -0.123 -0.107
(0.041)** (0.049)*
Time to nearest bus stop -0.009 -0.008
(0.002)** (0.003)**
Secondary water connection 0.1 0.176
(0.045)* (0.057)**
Individual water connection -0.112 -0.001
(0.043)** (0.053)
Individual sub-connection for water -0.114 -0.05
(0.056)* (0.067)
Community tap for water -0.215 -0.131
(0.058)** (0.068)
Hours per day of water from individual  0.011 0.015
  connection (0.002)** (0.003)**
Hours per day of water from individual sub- 0.012 0.016
  connection (0.003)** (0.004)**






OLS (hedonic) Regression for Rents and Prices
TABLE 6
prices. In the empirical analysis we dropped those observations for which rents or sale price were
Regression
  NOTE. - a) The dependent variable is the log value of rents b) the dependent variables is the log value of 
missing. Furthermore, we have trimmed the data by dropping observations for which rate of 
return is greater than 0.4 and less than .005.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
TABLE 7 
Opportunity cost of capital, Investment horizon, and Implied annual destruction rate (%) for Manilla, 1983 and Davao, 1979 
Implied annual destruction rate (%) 
Davao (Log Premium = 0.4)  Manilla (Log Premium = 0.1)  Investor's 
Opportunity cost of capital  Horizon = 20 years 50 years  Infinite Horizon  20 years  50 years  Infinite Horizon 
            
0.01  4.7 1.7 0.5 1.0  0.28  0.10 
0.03  5.0 2.4 1.5 1.2  0.32  0.20 
0.04  5.2 2.7 2.0 1.2  0.35  0.28 
0.05  5.5 3.0 2.5 1.3  0.40  0.30 
0.06  5.7 3.4 3.0 1.4  0.43  0.36 












of return is greater than 0.4 or less than 0.05. In total 47 observations were dropped.
TABLE 8
Regression
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regressions of the Rate of Return
  NOTE. - a) The dependent variable is the rate of return on housing, b) the dependent variable is   
the log value of rate of return. In the empirical analysis we dropped observations for which rate 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Variable All Households Informal Formal
Formal 0.367
(0.031)**
Quality of roof 0.057 0.202 0.01
(0.036) (0.049)** (0.047)
Quality of walls 0.086 0.153 0.04
(0.040)* (0.040)** (0.084)
Quality of exterior 0.299 0.18 0.352
(0.032)** (0.045)** (0.041)**
Total space of residence 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Number of rooms 0.225 0.247 0.231
(0.030)** (0.048)** (0.036)**
Space per room 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)** (0.001)* (0.000)*
Kitchen 0.199 0.122 0.234
(0.035)** (0.046)** (0.048)**
House used as a workplace 0.197 0.13 0.227
(0.044)** (0.063)* (0.057)**
Quality of toilet -0.23 -0.261 -0.213
(0.040)** (0.061)** (0.050)**
No sewerage -0.147 -0.091 -0.166
(0.031)** (0.040)* (0.045)**
Own standing house 0.021 -0.737 0.056
(0.057) (0.510) (0.067)
Attached house -0.123 -0.764 -0.112
(0.041)** (0.503) (0.046)*
Time to nearest bus stop -0.009 0 -0.015
(0.002)** -0.003 (0.003)**
Secondary water connection 0.1 0.185 0.073
(0.045)* (0.097) (0.051)
Individual water connection -0.112 -0.12 -0.087
(0.043)** (0.063) (0.056)
Individual sub-connection for water -0.114 -0.049 -0.063
(0.056)* (0.120) (0.065)
Community tap for water -0.215 -0.187 -0.281
(0.058)** (0.072)* (0.090)**
Hours per day of water from individual  0.011 -0.001 0.018
  connection (0.002)** (0.003) (0.003)**
Hours per day of water from individual sub- 0.012 0.006 0.012
  connection (0.003)** (0.011) (0.003)**
Hours per day of water from Community tap 0.009 0 0.019
(0.003)** (0.003) (0.008)*
Intercept 6.134 6.786 6.462
(0.097)** (0.511)** (0.144)**
Observations 2535 924 1611
R-squared 0.62 0.44 0.55
Regression
  NOTE. - The dependent variable is the log value of rents. In the empirical analysis we dropped
observations for which rents or sale price were missing. Furthermore, we have trimmed the data
by dropping observations for which rate of return is greater than 0.4 and less than .005.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
OLS Regression Explaining Rents: Dwelling unit characteristics
TABLE 9Variable All Households Informal Formal
Formal 0.566
(0.037)**
Quality of roof 0.037 0.172 0.004
(0.043) (0.059)** (0.056)
Quality of walls 0.17 0.35 -0.076
(0.049)** (0.051)** (0.101)
Quality of exterior 0.256 0.206 0.275
(0.034)** (0.045)** (0.046)**
Total space of residence 0 -0.0003 0
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Number of rooms 0.315 0.285 0.323
(0.035)** (0.055)** (0.045)**
Space per room 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.000)** (0.001)** (0.001)*
Kitchen 0.246 0.174 0.28
(0.040)** (0.053)** (0.054)**
House used as a workplace 0.198 0.11 0.226
(0.050)** (0.071) (0.065)**
Quality of toilet -0.205 -0.31 -0.174
(0.044)** (0.065)** (0.054)**
No sewerage -0.17 -0.093 -0.193
(0.033)** (0.046)* (0.047)**
Own standing house 0.075 -1.035 0.1
(0.066) (0.621) (0.074)
Attached house -0.107 -1.048 -0.126
(0.049)* (0.614) (0.053)*
Time to nearest bus stop -0.008 0 -0.014
(0.003)** (0.003) (0.004)**
Secondary water connection 0.176 0.266 0.149
(0.057)** (0.120)* (0.064)*
Individual water connection -0.001 -0.031 0.015
(0.053) (0.080) (0.069)
Individual sub-connection for water -0.05 -0.02 0.014
(0.067) (0.151) (0.077)
Community tap for water -0.131 -0.17 -0.173
(0.068) (0.090) (0.108)
Hours per day of water from individual  0.015 0.003 0.023
  connection (0.003)** (0.003) (0.004)**
Hours per day of water from individual sub- 0.016 0.015 0.015
  connection (0.004)** (0.009) (0.004)**
Hours per day of water from Community tap 0.01 0.003 0.02
(0.004)* (0.004) (0.0103)
Intercept 10.851 11.799 11.622
(0.119)** (0.623)** (0.177)**
Observations 2535 924 1611
R-squared 0.63 0.5 0.52
OLS Regression Explaining Prices: Dwelling unit characteristics
TABLE 10
Regression
  NOTE. - The dependent variable is the log value of prices. In the empirical analysis we have  dropped
observations for which rents or sale price were missing. Furthermore, we have trimmed the data
by dropping observations for which rate of return is greater than 0.4 and less than .005.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%